I. INTRODUCTION
It is now widely recognized that even if a country has a perfectly benevolent central bank (one that attempts to maximize the social welfare function), it may suffer from having an inflation rate which is systematically too high.' Suppose, for example, that a distortion (such as income taxation) causes the market rate of employment to be suboptimal. Then inflation can arise because wage setters rationally fear that the central bank will try to take advantage of short-term nominal rigidities to raise employment systematically. Only by setting high rates of wage inflation can wage setters discourage the central bank from trying to reduce the real wage below their target level.
This paper considers some institutional responses to the timeconsistency problem described above. In particular, we examine the practice of appointing "conservatives" to head the central bank, or of giving the central bank concrete incentives to achieve an intermediate monetary target. Our analysis of intermediate monetary targeting is quite different from conventional analyses in which the central bank is rigidly constrained to follow a particular feedback rule. Indeed, an important conclusion is that it is not generally optimal to legally constrain the central bank to hit its intermediate target (or follow its rule) exactly, or to choose "too" conservative an agent to head the central bank. By appointing a conservative or by providing the central bank with incentives to hit an intermediate monetary target, it is possible to induce less inflationary wage bargains. But this comes at the cost of distorting the central bank's responses to unanticipated disturbances, especially supply shocks. This is a cost because although the central bank cannot systematically raise employment (since private agents anticipate its incentives to inflate) monetary policy can still be used to stabilize inflation and employment around their mean market-determined levels.2 Thus, rigid targeting is appropriate only in certain very special cases. It is important to stress that, while "flexible" monetary targeting is preferable to either fully discretionary monetary policy or rigid monetary targeting, it is not necessarily the first-best solution to the problem of stagflation in this model. That depends on the source of the underlying labor market distortion which causes the market-determined level of employment to be too low. If this distortion can be removed at low social cost, then it would be possible both to raise employment and to lower inflation. A second-best solution, which does nothing to raise the mean level of employment, would be to legally impose a complete state-contingent money supply rule. As is discussed in Section III, there are a number of problems inherent in designing such a rule. But it is only when the first-and second-best solutions are too costly or unachievable that monetary targeting (or appointing a "conservative" central banker) should be used as a "third-best" solution to the problem of stagflation.
Section II of the text describes a stochastic rational expectations macroeconomic model in which, because of wage contracting, there is a well-defined role for central bank stabilization policy. Section III derives the time-consistent equilibrium under fully discretionary monetary policy. Section IV shows how society can make itself better off by appointing as head of the central bank an agent whose dislike for inflation relative to unemployment is known to be stronger than average. Section V reinterprets the formal analysis of Section IV as a model of inflation-rate targeting, and demonstrates how to extend the framework to encompass nominal GNP targeting, money supply targeting, and nominal interest rate targeting. Section VI discusses comparisons across regimes. Which target works best depends, of course, on the structure of the economy and the nature of the underlying disturbances. (Though we demonstrate that the interest rate is generally an unsatisfactory tool for precommitment.) In Section VII, the Conclusions, we stress the envelope-theorem interpretation of the main result: society wants the central bank to place "too large" a weight on inflation-rate stabilization relative to employment stabilization, but the weight should not be infinite.
II. THE MACROECONOMIC MODEL
Here we develop a stochastic rational expectations IS-LM model. Monetary policy can have short-term real effects in this model because nominal wage contracts are set a period in advance. Due to high administrative and negotiation costs, these contracts are not indexed fully against all possible disturbances.3
Aggregate Supply
Each of the large number of identical firms in the economy has a Cobb-Douglas production function. In the aggregate, (1) yt co + otk + (I -t) n, + zt, where y is output, k is the fixed capital stock, n is labor, co is a constant term, and z is an aggregate productivity disturbance; z -N(O,oz'). Throughout, lowercase letters denote natural logarithms and subscript t denotes time. All coefficients are nonnegative. Firms hire labor until the marginal product of labor equals the real wage:
(2) co + log(1 -a) + ak -antd+z =wt-Pt.
where w is the nominal wage, p is the price level, and nid is labor demand. Labor supply ns is an upward-sloping function of the real wage:
(3) nt n + w(wt-pt.
To simplify algebra without loss of generality, _n is set equal to k + (1/o&)[log(l -ox) + co]. As we shall later discuss, the above labor supply curve (3) is assumed to embody a distortion that raises the real wage required to induce a given level of labor supply. The nominal wage rate for period t is negotiated (on a firmby-firm basis) at the end of period t -1. The nature of the employment contract is that laborers agree to supply whatever amount of labor is demanded by firms in period t, provided that firms pay the negotiated wage rate wt. The level of employment in period t is thus found by substituting wt into equation (2): (4) nt = n + (Pt -wt)/o + ztIa.
In choosing Zwt, wage setters seek to minimize Et 1(n, -nt where Et-1 denotes expectations based on period t -1 information and nH is the level of employment that would arise if contracts could be negotiated after observing the productivity disturbance zt and all other period t information. Hn is found using the labor supply and demand equations (2) It is very important to note that output and employment stabilization are not equivalent to price prediction error minimization in the presence of a productivity shock (z).
Aggregate Demand
Demand for the good that firms produce is a decreasing function of the real interest rate:
4. This is the first of many times throughout the paper where use is made of the fact that certainty equivalence holds when the loss function is quadratic; see Sargent [1979]. where r is the level of the nominal interest rate and E,(p,, 1) -Pt represents the rate of inflation expected by investors, based on complete period t information. The serially uncorrelated goods market demand disturbance is ut -N(0,a2); u may be viewed as a transitory shift in intertemporal consumption preferences.
The demand for real money balances is a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate and an increasing function of output:
where m is the logarithm of the nominal money supply and v is a shift in portfolio preferences between money and bonds; v N(O, U). To simplify exposition, the disturbances, v, u, and z, are assumed to be independent and serially uncorrelated.
The Social Loss Function
The principal differences between the present paper and previous rational expectations cum wage contracting analyses of monetary stabilization policy derive from the specification of the social objective function. Because most models embody the natural rate hypothesis, the issue of whether or not the central bank wishes it could lower the average level of employment is commonly ignored. But this potential source of tension is fundamental to the conduct of stabilization policy. Indeed, if there does not exist any temptation for the monetary authorities to inflate systematically, then there is no reason to consider any regime other than fully discretionary monetary policy. (Note that the central bank's incentives to inflate need not be motivated by employment considerations, but can also arise due to the presence of nominal government debt or short-term rigidities in the tax system.)
Here we shall assume that some factor such as income taxation or unemployment insurance distorts the labor-leisure decision and causes the market-determined level of employment nt to lie below the socially optimal level of employment h' (see Barro and Gordon [1983a] ). We shall further assume that h' -ni is constant and equal to h -n.
The social loss function A depends on deviations of employment and inflation from their optimal (socially desired) levels:5 5. A similar social objective function is employed in Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983a] . Although the analysis below would have to be modified substantially if the central bank had a multiperiod objective function, the main points would still obtain.
(10) A, = (n, -t')2 + X(TIrtwhere Irt Pt -Pt-1, r is the socially desired trend inflation rate, and X is the relative weight society places on inflation stabilization versus employment stabilization. It is somewhat difficult, in the context of a rational expectations model, to argue that the level of the inflation rate has much direct weight in the social loss function.6 (However, the analysis below does not depend on X being particularly large.) The costs of inflation include the administrative costs of posting new prices and the costs of adjusting the tax system to be fully neutral with respect to inflation. And, of course, high rates of inflation force agents to economize on their holdings of non-interest-bearing money-the so-called "shoe leather cost of inflation." Despite the foregoing considerations, fr may be nonzero if alternative taxes to seignorage also generate deadweight costs through distortions (see Phelps [1973] ).
III. TIME-CONSISTENT EQUILIBRIUM UNDER FULLY DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY
Here, stochastic equilibrium is derived under the assumption that the monetary authorities attempt to minimize the social loss function A, given by equation (10) above.
Expectations about the future path of the money supply are not exogenously given in this model, but depend endogenously on agents' expectations about the monetary authorities' future shortrun stabilization objectives. Wage setters will not believe promised future paths for the money supply that are not time-consistent. Instead, equilibrium nominal wage increases are set at a sufficiently high level so that, in the absence of disturbances, the central bank will not choose to inflate the money supply beyond the point consistent with wage setters' desired real wage. At this high level of inflation, the central bank finds that the marginal gain from trying to raise employment above the natural rate is fully offset by the marginal cost of still higher inflation. Note also, that no individual group of wage setters has any incentive to change their wage bargain in the time-consistent equilibrium. Even though individual wage setters are concerned about infla-6. Unanticipated inflation enters indirectly into the social loss function (10) through its effect on employment. Fischer and Modigliani [1978] catalog the economic costs of both anticipated and unanticipated inflation. tion, the contract at their firm has only a small impact on the aggregate inflation rate.
By substituting equation ( (For simplicity, we treat the monetary authorities' objective function as constant.) Note that we are treating the price level as if the monetary authorities controlled it directly, ignoring the fact that the central bank directly controls only the money supply. The anticipated future path of the money supply consistent with (8.1) may be found using the macro model of equations (7) It should be observed that an individual group of wage setters has little incentive to index positively to the price level under the fully discretionary regime. The monetary authorities fully offset the effects of demand shocks, and because inflation as well as employment enters the social objective function, they do not allow the price level to move enough to optimally offset the employment effects of aggregate supply shocks. Obviously, a first-best solution to the stagflation problem described above would be to remove the labor market distortion. If this cannot be achieved at low social cost, a second-best solution would be to design a permanent constitutional reform that absolutely ruled out systematic inflation, and yet left the central bank scope to respond to disturbances. However, there are some practical drawbacks with constitutionally instituting a state-contingent money supply rule. To be fully effective, a rule must be set in place in such a way that it is very difficult to change. This, in turn, raises the danger that the rule will be difficult to alter after it becomes outmoded. Such problems might well arise because it is very difficult to predict the qualitative nature of the shocks buffeting the economy decades in advance. In the sixties, for example, it might have been difficult to anticipate the supply shocks of the seventies. Other factors such as innovations in transactions technology, regulatory changes, and the evolution of financial intermediaries all complicate the problem of designing a permanent monetary rule. (We are not suggesting that these problems are necessarily insurmountable.)
IV. SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER A "CONSERVATIVE" CENTRAL BANKER
Here we consider an alternative, less drastic, response to the stagflation problem posed above. We demonstrate that society can make itself better off by selecting an agent to head the independent central bank who is known to place a greater weight on inflation stabilization (relative to unemployment stabilization) than is embodied in the social loss function A. The term of the agent need last only one period, though in a multiperiod setting, reputational considerations will further help ameliorate the central bank's time-consistency problems.9 However, in choosing among potential candidates, it is never optimal to choose an individual who is known to care "too little" about unemployment, in a sense that will be made precise below.
Suppose, for example, that in period t -1 society selects an agent to head the central bank in period t. The reputation of this individual is such that it is known that if he is appointed to head the central bank, he will maximize the following objective function (henceforth, time t subscripts are omitted where the meaning is obvious):
(17) I= (n -h')2 + (X + E) Or _*)2, X + E>.
See Barro and Gordon [1983b], for example.
When E is strictly greater than zero, then this agent places a greater relative weight on inflation stabilization than society does. The algorithm for deriving the time-consistent equilibrium is exactly the same as in the previous section. Equations (18), (19), and (20) are the "I" regime counterparts of equations (13) Proof. Note that E > -X by assumption. Thus, by inspection of (22c), (3HIh3E is strictly negative. Note also, by inspection of (22b), that 8F1/8E is strictly negative for -X < E < 0, zero when E = 0, and positive for E > 0. Therefore, aA'/(3 is strictly negative for E ' 0. dA'/8l must change from negative to positive at some In the neighborhood of E = 0, the monetary authorities are minimizing [V (they are stabilizing optimally), so that aris/e is zero. But inflation is not being minimized, so that neither term in (a -ifr) is zero. We can argue similarly to suggest why Fmin < X. As E becomes large, i' goes to fr and HI is being minimized. Thus, for large E, the marginal inflation cost of reducing E is small relative to the stabilization gain. Of course, when there is no labor market distortion, so that n = n, then D= fr, and it does not pay to appoint a central banker who minimizes anything other than the social loss function.
We have assumed that the preferences of the agent appointed to head the central bank can be known with certainty. Clearly, many strategic problems arise when this assumption is relaxed. However, as long as there is some information on the probable preferences of alternative candidates, the basic point of the above analysis is still germane." The model is certainly consistent with the fact that central bankers are typically chosen from conservative elements of the financial community. One incentive that the head of the central bank might have for holding down inflation (17) measures the extra incentives (rewards or punishments) the central bank has for fulfilling its inflation-rate target. These incentives are additional to the fact that the inflation rate enters directly into the social objective function A.
In the absence of productivity disturbances, inflation-rate targeting works extremely well, since there is then no tradeoff with employment stabilization. Indeed, it would then make sense to make E as large as possible; raising E lowers the time-consistent inflation rate without placing any constraints on the ability of the monetary authorities to offset aggregate demand disturbances. If money supply changes transmit quickly into price level changes, then CPL targeting would be relatively easy to implement. The CPI is published monthly in many countries, and it would not be extraordinarily expensive to gather data at higher frequencies. The present model abstracts, however, from problems that arise if there are long lags in the monetary transmission mechanism.
If supply shocks are important, then it is natural to ask whether there are other intermediate targets that would allow the central bank to bring down the mean inflation rate at lower stabilization cost. We shall consider, in turn, nominal GNP targeting, money supply targeting, and interest rate targeting.
B. Nominal GNP Targeting
Because a positive supply shock tends to raise output and lower the price level, one would expect there to be some circumstances in which nominal GNP targeting is more appropriate than inflation-rate targeting. Suppose then that the central bank's target is nominal GNP so that its objective function is given by 16. An appendix to an earlier version of this paper discusses how to extend the present analysis to the case of incomplete contemporaneous information. This appendix and details of the proofs concerning R min and Tmin are available from the author on request. In other words, suppose that an intermediate targeting regime is put in place for one period, and the central bank is given incentives to bring interest rates below their trend rate, so that ? < rt+ 1. Then, instead of falling, the expected inflation rate and expected nominal interest rate rise. They rise because wage setters recognize that once wages are set, the central bank can lower interest rates through money growth. While it is true that the central bank could try to bring down inflation by setting ? greater than rt+ 1, the fact that this would indeed cause the market-determined interest rate rt to be less than itA+ 1 suggests a serious credibility problem. The central bank has to target high interest rates if it wants low interest rates.
The underlying problem is that given Et-(pt+l -Pt), announcing a target for rt is, in fact, tantamount to targeting the real interest rate. For the regimes analyzed earlier, targeting succeeds in at least temporarily lowering the inflation rate regardless of how long the targeting regime is expected to last. This is no longer true when the nominal interest rate is used as a target.18 (It should be clear that a misguided attempt to target a low real interest rate will produce similar problems.)
The nominal interest rate would not appear to be a suitable instrument for precommitment. This conclusion, of course, does not imply that the interest rate should not be used as an information variable in setting monetary policy, as in Poole [1970] . 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It can be entirely rational for society to structure its central bank in such a way that the monetary authorities have an objective function very different from the social welfare function. Whenever a distortion causes the time-consistent rate of inflation to be too high, then society can be made better off by having the central bank place "too large" a weight on inflation rate stabilization. The model presented here may help explain why many countries set up an independent central bank and choose its governors from conservative elements of the financial community.
Although society does want the central bank to place a large weight on inflation rate stabilization relative to employment stabilization, society will not (in general) want the weight to be infinite. By having the central bank place an infinite weight on inflation stabilization, society could succeed in bringing inflation down to its socially optimal level. But the central bank would also end up responding very inappropriately to supply shocks, allowing them to pass entirely through to employment. By lowering the weight which the central bank places on inflation, society could achieve a first-order stabilization gain at a second-order inflation cost. However, the inflation weight should not be so low that the central bank is placing the same weight on inflation-stabilization as society does. For then the central bank would be stabilizing optimally and by raising the central bank's weight on inflation, it would be possible to achieve a first-order inflation gain at a second-order stabilization cost (by the envelope theorem).
When supply shocks are important, society may prefer to give the central bank incentives to focus on a monetary target other than the inflation rate (though again, it is not optimal to have the weight on the target be infinite). It might be expected that the best monetary target would be the one most highly correlated with the society's ultimate objective function. But while this is a useful rule of thumb, the situation is actually somewhat more complicated. If one compares how each of the targets would work if used rigidly, one does not necessarily get the same ranking as when the central bank gives its target an optimal weight relative to direct social objectives. Thus, it can be misleading to analyze separately the stabilization and credibility problems of the central bank. The model also highlights strategic problems that can arise in setting targets at a non-inflationary level. If the central bank sets its nominal GNP target consistent with the socially optimal rate of employment, rather than the lower natural rate (perhaps because of political constraints), then nominal GNP targeting will have an inflationary bias. Money supply targeting presents similar problems if the demand for money is interest elastic. The central bank will overestimate next period's demand for money if it assumes (or is constrained to assume) that next period's expected inflation rate will be at the socially desired rate, rather than at the higher timeconsistent rate. (This problem does not arise under a permanent k percent rule.) We demonstrated that targeting low nominal interest rates is counterproductive and actually raises the time-consistent inflation rate. The problem is that once nominal wages are set, interest rates fall as money growth rises. Real interest rate targeting presents similar problems.
In order to make the macroeconomic model rich enough to do a meaningful analysis of alternative intermediate monetary targets, it was necessary to choose a rather simple game-theoretic structure. In particular, we did not allow for reputational factors that can be important in a multiperiod setting.21 However, although reputational considerations can ameliorate the central bank's credibility problems, they do not eliminate them except in certain very special cases. Therefore, the main point of this paper should extend to a more dynamic setting. 
